before negotiating with the chinese who will be hu jintao will be here in town next week for the nuclear summit. broadly speaking, if i have about a minute left, okay, the strategy of the obama administration, i think, has been to try to convince the russians that, you know, it probably is in your interest to have a better relationship with us washington than one with tehran if you think about -- think about your interests. and to think about your interests somewhat differently. and if we aren't able to reach a meeting on the minds on sanctions, you know, then other things, for example, wto and a one two three agreement even the ratification of s.t.a.r.t. 1 -- all those things are really going to be jeopardized on capitol hill where there's not a whole lot of sympathy towards the russians. the russian strategy consistently on the iranian nuclear issue and sanctions has been to try to find a way to

appear that they are cooperating with the united states and our allies on this. while not having to make a hard decision about selling tehran down the -- down the road. there was a big hull aballo when president medvedev said there was no sanctions on iran because the russians have supported three rounds of sanctions against iran in the u.n. lastly i think the administration would like to and extra strategic sense particularly in the reset with the russians is try to regain some leverage in the u.s./russia/china relationship. and i think it is worth -- i'll leave you with this thought in my opening remarks. while i think it's appropriate to have modest expectations about -- about the reset with the russians, when i look at the three key security issues driving the relationship, iran, afghanistan, and nuclear security, i would conclude that probably moscow's position on

all three of those sets of issues are closer to us than are beijing. and maybe that's something to think about. thanks. >> with that i would like to introduce my colleague, sharon squassoni. sharon is the fellow for our proliferation council and this is her first briefing at csis. >> thanks, andrew. i guess i'm the functional specialist here. i'm going to talk a little bit about the nuclear security summit that will take place in washington next monday. andrew mentioned the sort of three pronged agenda that president obama laid out last april in prague. there's nuclear arms control and disarmament, nonproliferation. and nuclear security. this april summit next week takes place just a month before the review conference of the

nuclear nonproliferation treaty. that happens every five years. president obama needs a big win. he needs something to gain more cooperation and collaboration from other members of the treaty. and so i think the nuclear security summit was designed with that in mind. to have something that would be splashy. that would have style but also have substance just one month before this important review conference. so what's going to happen? we're going to have 44 total -- 44 heads of state. we'll have hu jintao from china. and medvedev and prime minister from. iran and north korea will not show up and that's probably for the best. there will be a state dinner.

a heads of state dinner on the night of april the 12th. and then there will be two plenary sessions on the 13th that will focus on both national measures and on international cooperation to enhance nuclear security. more importantly, this is -- this is a big opportunity. i guess not since 1949 has there been such a big gathering of heads of state. and so as andrew mentioned, this will be an opportunity to discuss sanctions on iran. other pressing bilateral issues and, of course, some of these nuclear nonproliferation issues one month before that conference. on substance, it's a little trickier. and one of the questions that i often get is, what is nuclear security? what is this going to cover? not everyone agrees on which material poses the biggest threat or how big the threat is. and so one of the functions of

this conference will be to obtain greater agreement. let's start with a couple of facts and then i'll leave a lot of time for your questions. since 1993, there have been more than 1600 illicit nuclear trafficking incidents that have been reported to the iaea. not all of these have been serious. not all of them have involved weapons-useable material. but what it demonstrates is that there's a market out there. there's interest in trafficking in this material. this summit -- when you look at the kinds of material you can look at things in weapons stockpiles. you can look at weapons useable material, which is not just stuffing weapons and stockpiles but also in the civilian nuclear energy sector in research reactors. the third category of material is radioactive materials that you find everywhere, in

hospitals. these are sources used for cancer treatments and those kinds of things. so some particularly our european allies believe we should focus on those radioactive materials because they're not well guarded. they're a target of opportunity for terrorists. you can't make a nuclear weapon with them, however. but you can make what we call a dirty bomb. a radioactive weapon. and many experts agree that that is what terrorists would probably seek. nonetheless, this security summit next week will have focus on the weapons-useable material. there is enough material depending on who you talk to for between 120,000 weapons or 300,000 weapons. that range demonstrates right that we need to do more and

exchange more information. there needs to be a lot more transparency. and this is a job that is for all countries. not just nuclear weapon states, not just nuclear weapon holders like india, pakistan and israel. but for all states. and so going back to the agreement on what the threat is, one of the functions of the summit will be to get greater agreement on the fact that there is a threat. to get all countries to say, yes, we agree this is a problem. so the white house hopes for four things. that countries will be engaged. they will be more aware. they will pledge to do something about this. they will adopt best practices. and they will provide assistance to other countries. the nongovernmental organizations -- that community hopes for a little bit more. don't just focus on the existing regime. but do more.

actually, you know, consolidate, maybe eliminate these global stockpiles of material. i'm going to leave your specific questions about what countries can do for the q & a section. but this will be -- even -- i just want to close with -- even if there is a communique that is full of flowery language about each country's commitments -- even that will be helpful in this -- in this effort against nuclear terrorism primarily because we all know what to do but we're lacking the political will to do it and get it done in the shortest amount of time. thanks. >> thank you, sharon. i'd like to introduce my colleague, janusz bugajski. he's the chair in southeast europe studies and also the director of our new european

democracies project and he's a senior fellow in our europe program. and he's going to talk about this aspect of the trip. thanks. >> okay. thanks very much, andrew. good morning and welcome, everyone. i'm going to be exceptionally brief and i'm going to focus on president obama's meeting with the central european leaders which is planned in prague, i believe, thursday evening for a dinner. and i would say this to begin with. paradoxically, president obama's planned meeting with 11 leaders from the new democracies, the new nato allies is intended to demonstrate that relations with central eastern europe have not been reset or have not been downgraded, which is the way it's perceived in some parts of the region. in other words, despite attempts to upgrade relations with russia as andy has been saying primarily through the s.t.a.r.t. treaty, the u.s. will not according to the obama administration -- let me make five points here. one, weaken its commitments to

nato security guarantees. two, withdraw militarily from europe. three, agree to any redivision of the continent into blocs or spheres of influence. the continent is the old continent of europe. four, close the door to further nato enlargement east wards and five make any grand bargains with moscow over the heads of former satellites in central eastern europe. however, i would say the very fact that such reassurances need to be emphasized indicates that several capitals in the region remain troubled. not just about russia's aspirations in the neighborhood but about u.s. and nato policy towards russia. for this reason, there are several landmark developments ahead that will prove significant for the new allies and i think these are going to be discussed at the dinner. countries that are seeking not only reassurance but an upgrade

of nato's security commitments. let me mention three. first of all, the framing of nato's new strategic concept which is in the works which has been worked out as we speak. and how russia is depicted and interpreted in the document. lisbon in november and what commitments are made to enlargement and mutual defense and nato's role over the coming decade. there's a huge debate over what role nato is playing. is it a global nato? is it nato back to basics? or how can the two be combined? and there's different views in how this should be structured. and three, the contours of the new missile defense system. i remember president obama cancelled the bush version and he's talked about his own version to which several countries in central eastern europe have already quickly signed up including romania, possibly bulgaria, certainly the poles and the czechs are interested. the question is there exactly

how this will be an integrated nato system. how will russia and if russia will be included in the planned system as the nato secretary-general has been offering over the past few weeks. it is worth remembering in this context that one of the reasons warsaw and prague initially signed onto the bush version of the missile defense was not so much defense against iran. but to try and establish a closer bilateral link with the united states. bilateral military link with the united states at a time when doubts over nato solidarity were growing. as several west european countries had reset their relations with russia to quite warm if not very warm which troubled some countries in the region. so to matters or to conclude, let me say this that the central european states bordering russia are concerned about russia's ambitions in countries such as ukraine, moldova and georgia. andrew mentioned the possibility of another war in georgia. it's not to be discounted.

and the pressure that moscow can exert even on their own security particularly with the most -- more vulnerable three baltic stimulates. -- states. as proof of nato's article 5 defense guarantees, they have pushed the alliance to prepare four contingency plans for their defense. which is now evidently taking place for the three baltic states to stage more regular exercises not just air exercises in the eastern part of nato. russia has staged quite, i would say provocative exercises last year next to the polish and baltic borders. and nato did not respond. and even to positions some nato infrastructure on their territories. this is why the -- this month the deployment of a battery of missiles with a small american contingent in northern poland is

significant because it ties nato closer to the defense of these countries. they also -- last point, they also want greater clarity as to how nato countries interpret article 5. which is subject to some debate. and proof that the alliance is an effective deterrence policy. let me stop there and if you have any questions, i'll be happy to answer. >> great. we'll open it up to questions now. questions. julianna? >> thank you. i was wondering if you could elaborate a bit -- you talked about the political capital that the president has now. and just the capital he has with european leaders because of the s.t.a.r.t. treaty and how that will play out with other issues, other nuclear issues this year. and looking forward? >> it's a great question. it's hard to quantify.

you know, i just think that given the success that the administration has experienced in the last month, you know, international leaders whether they're in europe or elsewhere i think they have to regard the administration as one which is -- i mean, there was a broad tendency i think and an increasing tendency given the difficulty of the first year of the obama administration to sort of, you know -- well, it's weak. it's discounted. and this is not -- you know, we may not -- we may not be dealing with this guy, you know, in 2012 and beyond. i think that calculation has to look different now than just a month ago. how it's going to, you know, play out -- well, the most imminent question is how it's going to play out on the sanctions on iran.

and i think behind the scenes the administration has been getting closer to a meeting of the minds not only with the russians but also to some extent with the chinese. and i would point to the fact that hu jintao decided to come to the nuclear summit next week. as, you know, this may not be -- you can't directly tie a correlation necessarily between, you know, victory in healthcare and the s.t.a.r.t. 1 treaty and that but the fact that he's coming here sort of bolsters this image that this is a president that is, you know, looking -- looking more successful. how successful they're going to be with the sanctions on iran and i don't think anybody in the obama administration has any illusions that whatever sanctions are leveled on the iranians, that this is, you know, going to solve the problem. but we'll just have to wait and see. maybe some of my colleagues have some other comments on that.

>> christie parsons from the "chicago tribune." could you follow up just a bit. what are we likely to see? will there be developments this week, in the coming week on sanctions on iran and how would they become evident? what are you expecting? >> in a lot of ways we're in the same place we've always been on. sanctions on iran, over the past few years we've tried to target sanctions so that they didn't affect the iranian people as a whole. all the while knowing that the kinds of things which would really get the iranians' attention are the kinds of things that hurt. so restrictions on refined petroleum products into iran. they not only hurt the iranian people but they hurt iran's trading partners.

you know, it's easy for the u.s. to talk about sanctions. we don't have a big trading relationship with iran. it's a lot harder with russia and china. particularly, china. so the effort right now since iran has really refused to comply with u.n. security council resolutions and even the kind of olive branch offering in the fall to get back to the negotiating table, we're engaged in an effort to get another round of u.n. security council resolutions. and the issue is will china at best support if -- or a not so bad outcome would be if they just abstained. and how much will russia support a new round of sanctions. there are a lot of things that can be done outside of the u.n. security council.

and a lot of those measures that deal with transactions at banks, et cetera, have been helpful. but iran shows no sign of either returning to the negotiating table or halting its enrichment program. and so i think we're in a slightly better position. the chinese have shown a little bit more flexibility. up until now they have been taking a principled stand against sanctions. but we'll have to see. this security summit next week really does offer an opportunity to talk on the margins. this is what happens at major summits. and so i think the hope is there as well as this meeting in prague is that we can bring, you know, first russia and then china along. >> i don't think we're going to see sanctions on the energy sector, oil and gas sector. and i'm skeptical we're going to see sanctions on arms exports to

iran. i think both the russians and the chinese are not going to sign on that for different reasons. but it looks like there is a decent likelihood of more restrictions in the bank -- the banking sector in trying to restrict the access that some of the political leadership and political economic elite has to -- has to capital. now, one of the positive things that i took note of about two weeks ago was the report that actually the russians and the chinese have made a demarch to the iranians about their failures to be more forthcoming to the iaea on their nuclear program. it was a little bit lost it was the same week in which it was announced the s.t.a.r.t. 1 treaty was basically agreed to. but in a debriefing at the national security council, that was -- they pointed to that as quite a positive sign. now, it's kind of interesting.

they weren't able to say to what -- they expected that it was a russia initiative. to the chinese but nobody was quite sure about that. which again kind of raises the interesting aspect of the -- how the russian and chinese relationship to what extent are they together and to what extent are we breaking them off somewhat. i think it's clear that on iran, the russians are closer to us than the -- than the chinese are. >> if i could just add eery briefly in terms of russian policy towards iran, it's very ambiguous, i would say. on the one hand, they don't want iran to develop a nuclear capability. on the other hand, they don't want a u.s./iran rapprochement because of the zero-sum calculations greater u.s. influence means lesser russia influence. it suits for them for us to have a little bit of a problem in the region with iran. not one that get out of hand and

descends into some sort of strike against iranian nuclear facilities or what we suspect are nuclear facilities or for are them to develop a nuclear device that could be deployable. that could be used. so it's this ambiguous position. and we see the same, i think, in afghanistan. in other words, they want to help us. they don't want us to lose but they don't want us to win either. so it's a sort of tieing down american resources. restricting american influence. and using themselves as a potential mediator and problem-solver. that's part of the strategy. >> margaret? >> thanks. it sounds like you're all saying we should look at the prague trip as in sort of the larger context of all these things are going to be happening over the course of the next month. in that vein, two questions. we're looking at the release of the npr tomorrow. the white house says. and i want to ask you how it all fits in with this. and then also india, pakistan,

they'll both be at -- participating in the summit. and i'm curious what sort of interplay between those countries you'll be watching over the next month. and also how president karzai's recent comments in afghanistan you think will factor into the meetings in prague and all the discussions in terms of what to expect? >> i'll start on the npr. the nuclear posture review not national public radio. [laughter] >> the long-awaited nuclear posture review. what this has done in the past -- it's a congressionally mandated document. it sets out the role of nuclear weapons in u.s. national security strategy. and it's no coincidence that the bush administration's nuclear posture review basically said well, we can go down -- i guess it was 2000 warheads and that's what you saw in the s.o.r.t.

treaty, the moscow treaty. and so the nuclear posture review this time around should -- you know, it will talk about what are the primary uses of nuclear weapons? what are levels that we can live with? i don't think there's going to be a whole lot that will be very surprising. but it should support what the obama administration is doing with both new s.t.a.r.t. and follow-on negotiations there. on india and pakistan, you know, pakistan is probably -- even though the nuclear security summit is not designed and hopes to avoid actually pointing fingers at any single country, but obviously the issue of nuclear security is a big one in pakistan. both the security of nuclear material and the security of their nuclear weapons. i don't think -- i can't imagine we're going to see too much --

too much progress between india and pakistan at this summit but i think it's a good thing that both are at least attending. andy, do you want to -- >> well, one comment. about the administration's going to zero agenda. which is secretary of defense gates said last week is not anything that's going to happen soon. but i mean, one of the fundamental problems about that agenda is that enlisting the support of other countries with it. beginning with the russians. and then the chinese. and then the indians and the pakistanis and so on down the line. i mean, nobody else in the world -- no other nation state in the world which is an officially recognized or unofficially recognized nuclear weapons state is particularly enthusiastic about it. because the united states enjoys -- particularly for the russians. here's the rub.

for the russians, their concern is that the combination of their eroding the -- the tremendous eroding of their traditional weapons forces plus, the deteriorating numbers on offensive forces. plus the u.s. conventional weapons development in which there are weapons which is close or near nuclear capabilities plus, the development of missile defenses -- all of that from the russian standpoint and the russians are not alone in this see this as potentially making the world safe for american military intervention whenever we want. and that's a core tension. and challenge, you know, for the agenda. and it's pretty easy to understand. when, you know, we are spending 55% of the world expenditures on global arms and telling the rest of the world that, you know, we should be moving very, very aggressively down in their nuclear weapons which for them

is the asymmetric balancer. that's a pretty tough nut to crack. and it's going to become more telling as we get beyond the s.t.a.r.t. 1 replacement treaty. on the karzai comments, wow. sometimes with -- some of our friends, you know -- friends like that, who needs enemies? sorry, we are on tv. i mean, this is the crux of the problem in afghanistan. [laughter] >> and if indeed mr. -- it is true that mr. karzai is going to be at the nuclear summit in washington next week -- [inaudible] >> sorry? [inaudible] >> that was the reference to the may 12th separate meeting. okay. >> this is still on as of today. that's what robert gibbs said this morning at the gaggle.

>> well, obviously one of the core problems we face in afghanistan is the competitive instincts of pakistan and india. and so i would have to think that with both of the leaders here next week, that that may be a point of discussion hopefully. with the upcoming -- the planned offensive in kandahar, you know, ambassador eikenberry was here recently. and his comment was, you know, this is one part political -- excuse me, one part military, five parts political. the one part military, the afghan leadership is likely to support. the five parts political, big, big question mark. >> welcome to the bipartisan nonideologically driven center for strategic for international studies. right over here. >> francine kiefer from the "christian science monitor." i would like to go back with the

reset of russia subject. could you talk a little bit about the political aspect of it. and whether you see any relationship developing between obama and medvedev? whether that could cause a split between medvedev and putin in terms of direction of the country. where do you see the politics going and obama perhaps finding a better friend in medvedev than he may find in putin? >> well, i think there's no question that president obama finds it easier and more pleasant to interact with mr. medvedev than he does with mr. putin. it's a tricky -- a tricky point. on foreign policy and security issues, my view has been and m